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To cite this article before publication: Ilissa Bonnie Ocko *et al* 2021 *Environ. Res. Lett.* in press <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abf9c8>

Manuscript version: Accepted Manuscript

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LETTER

Acting rapidly to deploy readily available methane mitigation measures by sector can immediately slow global warming

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Received xxxxxx

Accepted for publication xxxxxx

Published xxxxxx

Abstract

Methane mitigation is essential for addressing climate change, but the value of rapidly implementing available mitigation measures is not well understood. In this paper, we analyze the climate benefits of fast action to reduce methane emissions as compared to slower and delayed mitigation timelines. We find that the scale up and deployment of greatly underutilized but available mitigation measures will have significant near-term temperature benefits beyond that from slow or delayed action. Overall, strategies exist to cut global methane emissions from human activities in half within the next ten years and half of these strategies currently incur no net cost. Pursuing all mitigation measures now could slow the global-mean rate of near-term decadal warming by around 30%, avoid a quarter of a degree Centigrade of additional global-mean warming by midcentury, and set ourselves on a path to avoid more than half a degree Centigrade by end of century. On the other hand, slow implementation of these measures may result in an additional tenth of a degree of global-mean warming by midcentury and 5% faster warming rate (relative to fast action), and waiting to pursue these measures until midcentury may result in an additional two tenths of a degree Centigrade by midcentury and 15% faster warming rate (relative to fast action). Slow or delayed methane action is viewed by many as reasonable given that current and on-the-horizon climate policies heavily emphasize actions that benefit the climate in the long-term, such as decarbonization and reaching net-zero emissions, whereas methane emitted over the next couple of decades will play a limited role in long-term warming. However, given that fast methane action can considerably limit climate damages in the near-term, it is urgent to scale up efforts and take advantage of this achievable and affordable opportunity as we simultaneously reduce carbon dioxide emissions.

Keywords: Methane mitigation, climate change, climate policy, rate of warming, early action

1. Introduction

Methane is a major contributor to climate change and plays a dominating role in how fast the climate warms (Myhre *et al* 2013). However, although myriad mitigation strategies have been identified over the last decade (e.g. EPA 2013), uptake remains slow and global emissions continue to rise (Saunio *et al* 2020). Given that climate policies are mostly oriented around long-term climate stability goals (IPCC 2018) and use climate metrics that undervalue methane's role in the near-term (Ocko *et al* 2017), there is less urgency to reduce methane now at the extent warranted. Here we demonstrate the value of fast action to deploy readily available methane mitigation measures as opposed to slow and delayed action, with a key focus on sectoral roles. We have a powerful opportunity to slow down the rate of warming and limit temperature rise by midcentury if we act now, which would provide considerable benefits to society and ecosystems.

The prominent and growing role of methane emissions in present and future climate change is increasingly understood – methane contributes to at least a quarter of today's gross warming (Myhre *et al* 2013, Ocko *et al* 2018), its concentration continues to rise rapidly in large part from anthropogenic sources (Schwietzke *et al* 2016, Fletcher and Schaefer 2019, Nisbet *et al* 2019, Hmiel *et al* 2020, Jackson *et al* 2020, Saunio *et al* 2020), and several studies have shown the outsized value of its mitigation in limiting warming over the next few decades due to its short atmospheric lifetime (Shindell *et al* 2012, Shoemaker *et al* 2013, Collins *et al* 2018, Smith *et al* 2020). These insights have led to the development of innovative technologies and strategies to reduce methane emissions from all major emitting sectors – such as the straightforward plugging of natural gas leaks (IEA 2017) to ruminant feed supplements (Hristov *et al* 2015) – and the resulting abatement potentials for readily available measures have been characterized (EPA 2013, 2019, IEA 2017, Harmsen *et al* 2019, 2020, Höglund-Isaksson *et al* 2020, Arndt *et al* 2021).

Given methane's short-lived presence in the atmosphere, deployment of these mitigation measures would have a near-immediate impact on slowing down the rate of warming. However, current government and company climate policies are focused on addressing long-term climate stability in particular (such as via net zero targets), which inadvertently imply that methane mitigation can wait until midcentury due to its short lifetime (IPCC 2018). Further, these policies use the traditional climate metrics Global Warming Potential and its Carbon Dioxide

Equivalence counterpart, with a 100-year time horizon that undervalues the role of short-lived climate pollutants – such as methane – in driving near-term and rate of warming (Ocko *et al* 2017). While there is vast scientific consensus that severely limiting total global warming over the next century is essential to preventing profound damages to life on Earth, many risks to society and ecosystems arise from the rate of warming, and the ability to adapt to anticipated changes is greatly diminished by a quicker pace (IPCC 2018).

Therefore, while it is essential to minimize warming over the coming decades in addition to the long-term, we are currently on a path that supports either slow or delayed action on methane despite numerous readily available and affordable mitigation measures for each major-emitting sector (e.g. Höglund-Isaksson *et al* 2020). It is therefore possible that we are situated to miss an unmatched opportunity to slow down the rate of warming and its concomitant damages immediately (McKenna *et al* 2021).

Several studies to date analyze the climate benefits of methane mitigation (Shindell *et al* 2012, Hu *et al* 2013, Shoemaker *et al* 2013, Collins *et al* 2018, Stohl *et al* 2015, Rogelj *et al* 2015, Harmsen *et al* 2020, Lund *et al* 2020, Smith *et al* 2020). These studies cover a range of mitigation assumptions and timelines; employ different methodologies for determining climate impacts (from simple metrics to reduced complexity models to earth system models); contain varying scopes of temporal, spatial, and sectoral breakdowns; and assess different climate impact variables (mostly radiative forcing and temperature but also precipitation and sea level rise). Studies find that mitigation of methane can slow down the rate of warming and sea level rise (e.g. Hu *et al* 2013, Shoemaker *et al* 2013), lower midcentury warming (e.g. Shindell *et al* 2012, Smith *et al* 2020), and is essential to achieving long-term temperature targets (e.g. Collins *et al* 2018, IPCC 2018). Studies also show that direct methane mitigation measures are more effective at reducing emissions than reductions as a result of ambitious carbon dioxide mitigation (Harmsen *et al* 2020), and that stringent methane mitigation can allow for higher carbon dioxide budgets for a specific temperature target (Rogelj *et al* 2015).

Despite the range of methane mitigation timelines and magnitudes analyzed in previous studies, the benefits of rapidly deploying available mitigation measures compared to gradual or delayed actions remain unclear. Here, we synthesize the latest assessments on readily available opportunities to reduce methane emissions from agriculture, energy systems, and waste management, and evaluate the

1 climate benefits of their deployment over different
2 timelines by using a well-known reduced-complexity
3 climate model. We divide methane mitigation measures
4 into two categories: those that can be pursued now at no net
5 cost even in the absence of carbon pricing (herein referred
6 to as ‘economically feasible’ actions), and those that can be
7 pursued now based on all existing technologies and
8 strategies (herein referred to as ‘technically feasible’
9 actions). We evaluate the climate benefits over all
10 timescales – both in the near- and long-term – for three
11 implementation timelines: fast, slow, and delayed action.
12 We present our results for aggregate methane emissions
13 and also by individual sector, to show how sector-based
14 mitigation contributes to the climate benefits.

15 By connecting existing sector-specific methane
16 abatement measures to tangible near-term temperature
17 benefits, we aim to mobilize the political and corporate will
18 to accelerate and scale up deployment of these already
19 available but greatly underutilized mitigation
20 opportunities, and as a result, reduce climate damages well
21 before midcentury. We emphasize that methane mitigation
22 is not intended to replace the unequivocal need to urgently
23 act to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, but rather is a
24 complementary approach that can add critical near-term
25 benefits not otherwise achievable.

26 2. Methods

27 2.1 Emissions scenarios

28 We develop three sets of future methane emissions: a
29 baseline scenario representing no further climate action,
30 and two scenarios for methane mitigation that represent a
31 range of potential ambition from minimum to maximum
32 action based on current cost assessments and available
33 technologies. We consider three implementation timelines
34 for both sets of mitigation scenarios: one with fast action
35 beginning in 2020 with full deployment by 2030; one with
36 slow action beginning in 2020 with full deployment by
37 2050; and one with delayed action beginning in 2040 with
38 full deployment by 2050.

39 **2.1.1 Baseline projections.** Several previous assessments
40 have developed global methane emissions projections for
41 future baseline scenarios (e.g. Riahi *et al* 2007, 2017, JRC
42 2019, 2020, Harmsen *et al* 2019, 2020, EPA 2019,
43 Höglund-Isaksson *et al* 2020). There is a widespread range
44 of socioeconomic and technological assumptions
45 embedded in these projections, as well as different
46 regional, sectoral, and temporal coverage. Emissions range
47 from 332 to 439 million metric tonnes (MMt) in 2020, 398
48 to 677 MMt in 2050, and 460 to 888 MMt in 2100.

49 For this analysis, we use the baseline methane
50 emissions scenario developed by Höglund-Isaksson *et al*

51 (2020). This is because of the availability of sector and
52 subsector information, incorporation of the latest science
53 and data (such as oil and gas estimates), and emissions that
54 are in the middle of the range of available projections
55 (2020: 351 MMt and 2050: 447 MMt). Höglund-Isaksson
56 *et al* (2020) uses the integrated assessment modelling
57 framework, GAINsv4, to estimate methane emissions
58 through 2050 with a bottom-up sectoral approach informed
59 by numerous resources. Baseline emissions consider
60 effects from regulations and legislation adopted as of
61 December 2018, with no further climate action beyond
62 these measures. Extrapolation of baseline emissions trends
63 through 2100 provides reasonable estimates when
64 compared to other baseline scenarios that have projections
65 throughout the end of the century (i.e., Riahi *et al* 2007,
66 2017, JRC 2019, Climate Watch 2021), and yields a total
67 amount of 611 MMt of methane emitted in 2100. See
68 supplemental material for data and comparisons with other
69 assessments for total emissions and by sector (figure S1).

70 For baseline emissions of non-methane climate
71 forcers, which are particularly important for analysing
72 changes in the rate of warming, we use the most commonly
73 employed RCP8.5 scenario. While some have argued that
74 this is an unrealistic baseline (e.g. Hausfather and Peters
75 2020), others assert that RCP8.5 is particularly well-suited
76 for emissions out to midcentury and not unreasonable for
77 late century (Schwalm *et al* 2020). Given that this work is
78 focused on the midcentury timeline and that the majority of
79 our analysis is for methane impacts only (of which the
80 magnitude of methane baseline or avoided warming is
81 insensitive to the selection of a non-methane baseline – see
82 supplemental material for more details), RCP8.5 is suitable
83 for our purposes.

84 **2.1.2 Abatement potentials.** We consider two
85 levels of methane mitigation that encompass a range of
86 realistic methane actions. As a lower bound, we consider
87 only actions that can be achieved at no net cost, without a
88 price on carbon or methane; for actions that capture
89 methane, the value of the captured methane is included in
90 the cost assessment. The only exception is the inclusion of
91 commitments made by oil and gas companies, which we
92 consider as cost-effective in that companies have
93 determined that these measures fit within their business
94 models in the existing economic framework. We refer to
95 this lower bound mitigation case as “economically
96 feasible.” As an upper bound, we consider the other end of
97 the spectrum: the most optimistic case conceivable for
98 methane abatement within the next 10 years given existing
99 technologies, practices, and structural changes that are
100 either readily available for deployment or require at most
101 minor improvements. However, we do not include
102 consideration of more radical policy proposals (such as
103 phase-out of methane pipelines or combustion) and

1 changes in dietary behaviour (such as global veganism) as
2 the achievability of these measures is much less realistic
3 than implementation of technological strategies. We refer
4 to this upper bound mitigation case as “technically
5 feasible,” and it inherently includes the economically
6 feasible actions as well.

7 We surveyed the literature to identify economically and
8 technically feasible abatement potentials for the six major
9 emitting sectors that represent 90% of current emissions
10 (livestock, rice production, the oil and gas supply chain,
11 coal mining, landfills, and wastewater treatment; figure 1).
12 Given that the relative abatement potentials of specific
13 mitigation measures within each sector (such as an
14 individual technology or action) will depend on a range of
15 scientific and non-scientific characteristics that are
16 regionally dependent (Höglund-Isaksson *et al* 2020), we
17 restrict our analysis to assessing the relative climate
18 benefits of total potential methane mitigation from each
19 major sector. However, we include a list of the most
20 prominent mitigation measures within each sector that are
21 considered in the literature (Table 1) and discuss in more
22 detail in the supplemental material.

23 For abatement potentials at no cost (“economically
24 feasible”), we use marginal abatement cost curve
25 assessments developed by four sources: IEA (2017), EPA
26 (2019), Harmsen *et al* (2019), and Höglund-Isaksson *et al*
27 (2020). Given that Harmsen *et al* (2019) includes
28 advancements in technology over time, we only use their
29 estimates of abatement potentials for 2020 emissions,
30 whereas we use 2030 estimates for EPA (2019) and
31 Höglund-Isaksson *et al* (2020).

32 Abatement potentials at no cost are averaged across
33 EPA (2019), Harmsen *et al* (2019), and Höglund-Isaksson
34 *et al* (2020) for rice (6%), coal mining (6%), landfills
35 (16%), and wastewater (1%) (% represents how much can
36 be abated below 2030 baseline). For livestock (2%), we
37 average EPA (2019) and Höglund-Isaksson *et al* (2020)
38 estimates given that these values are more conservative
39 than the Harmsen *et al* (2019) outlier value of 22%. For oil
40 and gas emissions, we supplement IEA’s (2017) no cost
41 abatement potential of 45% below present-day emissions
42 with oil and gas company commitments of limiting
43 upstream natural gas leaks to 0.2% of total production
44 levels. This yields an increase in the abatement potential
45 from 50% below 2030 levels to 77%. More details
46 regarding this calculation and its feasibility are provided in
47 the supplemental material. Further, locked in capital makes
48 several measures more expensive today than they may
49 become in the future, and therefore we expect that several
50 measures will become more cost effective over time. In
51 addition, as the price of oil and gas fluctuates, the amount
52 of emissions that can be reduced for no net cost from oil

53 and gas measures will also fluctuate. We do not include
54 changing cost effectiveness over time in our analysis.

55 For abatement potentials that cover all existing
56 technological mitigation measures at any cost (“technically
57 feasible”), we survey the scientific literature in addition to
58 the above sources. We apply the most optimistic abatement
59 potentials by sector to global emissions, therefore
60 representing a best-case scenario of potential reductions
61 with all-in methane action. However, we note that there is
62 large diversity in systems and practices across world
63 regions and thus applying optimistic abatement potentials
64 on a global scale has uncertainties. Further, we do not
65 include political, social, and information barriers to
66 implementing available technologies, that undoubtedly
67 exist in many parts of the world. The reason for this
68 approach is to provide information on the maximum
69 climate benefits achievable from deployment of readily
70 available measures.

71 For the livestock sector, we apply the upper end
72 abatement potentials from a meta-analysis on methane
73 mitigation strategies for livestock (30% below baseline;
74 Arndt *et al* 2021). We use estimates from Höglund-
75 Isaksson *et al* (2020) for rice (49%), coal mining (61%),
76 landfills (80%), and wastewater (72%). While these
77 potentials are identified for 2050, they do not reflect any
78 major developments in technology beyond today, and for
79 our upper end “technically feasible” estimates, we do not
80 consider the role of locked in capital. For oil and gas, we
81 supplement the IEA (2017) abatement potential of 75%
82 below current levels with voluntary company commitments
83 of capping upstream leakage. This results in an 83% below
84 2030 level abatement potential rather than 77% without
85 industry targets.

86 Overall, while the existing potential to reduce methane
87 emissions varies considerably by sector and by mitigation
88 level (figure 1), if deployed in parallel they can cut
89 anticipated methane emissions in 2030 in half, with a
90 quarter of total emissions reduced at no net cost.

91 **2.1.3 Mitigation timelines.** Abatement potentials are
92 applied to baseline emissions throughout the century to
93 develop two sets of methane mitigation scenarios:
94 economically feasible and technically feasible paths. For
95 each of these scenarios, we develop three implementation
96 timelines that vary mitigation deployment between 2020
97 and 2050. After 2050, both sets of mitigation scenarios are
98 identical amongst the three timelines.

99 To capture the climate benefits of an immediate effort
100 to deploy available methane mitigation measures, we
101 assume an early and rapid implementation plan with
102 deployment beginning now and reaching maximum
103 abatement potentials in 2030. This leads to an immediate
104 drop in emissions from 2020 to 2030. However, because
105 the majority of abatement potentials are defined as a

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3 1 reduction potential below a baseline, as populations grow
4 2 and countries develop, emissions will continue to slowly
5 3 rise even with sustained mitigation efforts. This is because
6 4 demand for livestock, for example, will increase in the
7 5 future, yet we hold the abatement potential (percent below
8 6 baseline) constant throughout the end of the century (i.e.,
9 7 no further mitigation potential is tapped after 2030).

10 8 To compare the benefits to slower and delayed
11 9 implementation plans, we also analyse implementation
12 10 beginning in 2020 with linear ramp up reaching full
13 11 potential by 2050 (“slow” mitigation), and implementation
14 12 beginning in 2040 and reaching full potential by 2050
15 13 (“delayed” mitigation consistent with what is needed to
16 14 achieve long-term temperature targets).

17 15 We compare our mitigation scenarios with existing
18 16 literature in the supplemental material (*figure S2*). Overall,
19 17 our pathways fall within the realm of previously developed
20 18 scenarios. Comparing our technically feasible fast action
21 19 scenario in particular shows that it is most similar to
22 20 methane emissions developed by JRC GECO (2019, 2020)
23 21 for paths consistent with 1.5°C temperature targets, as well
24 22 as a short-lived climate pollutant mitigation path developed
25 23 using ECLIPSE (Stohl *et al* 2015). In the long-run, given
26 24 that we keep mitigation levels at the same abatement
27 25 potentials for each sector (and do not account for new
28 26 technologies, etc.), we find that our economically feasible
29 27 scenarios lead to emissions that are higher in 2100 than all
30 28 but one scenario (SSP4-60). Our technically feasible
31 29 scenarios lead to emissions in 2100 that are in the middle
32 30 of the range. Overall, most existing methane mitigation
33 31 scenarios are characterized as having slow implementation
34 32 of mitigation measures in the near-term.

35 32 36 33 **2.2 Climate model**

37 34 We employ a prominent and freely available reduced-
38 35 complexity climate model, Model for the Assessment of
39 36 Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC)
40 37 version 6 (Meinshausen *et al* 2011), which has been used
41 38 in several policy-oriented climate analyses involving short-
42 39 lived climate pollutants (e.g. Shoemaker *et al* 2013, IEA
43 40 2017, Reisinger and Clark 2017, Smith *et al* 2020).
44 41 MAGICC’s ability to simulate temperature responses to
45 42 methane emissions has been previously validated with a
46 43 higher complexity climate model; Ocko *et al* (2018)
47 44 performed a series of experiments to compare forcing and
48 45 temperature responses to historical methane emissions in
49 46 MAGICC to those from a more complex coupled global
50 47 chemistry–climate model, GFDL-CM3. Overall forcings
51 48 and temperature responses were comparable between the
52 49 two models for both direct and indirect methane effects.
53 50 Further confidence in MAGICC comes from decades of
54 51 work improving model parameterizations (Meinshausen *et al*
55 52 *et al* 2011) and comparisons of its performance within the

53 context of other reduced complexity climate models
54 (Nicholls *et al* 2020).

55 The major benefits of using a reduced-complexity
56 climate model are ease of use with basic knowledge and
57 limited computational infrastructure; rapid results for time-
58 sensitive policy purposes; and the ability to analyse small
59 forcing changes due to the absence of unforced internal
60 variability. However, limitations exist, such as coarse
61 spatial resolutions and parametrizations, and one common
62 to all climate models, uncertainties based on the extent of
63 our physical understanding of myriad systems.

64 MAGICC represents the coupled carbon-cycle climate
65 system as a hemispherically averaged upwelling-diffusion
66 ocean coupled to a four-box atmosphere and a globally
67 averaged carbon cycle model (Meinshausen *et al* 2011).
68 We use default model properties and inputs, but update
69 methane-related properties based on the latest science;
70 detailed information on model components, inputs, and
71 parameters, as well as modifications for this analysis, can
72 be found in the supplemental material. We run 50 distinct
73 335-year integrations from 1765 to 2100. For 11
74 integrations, we include a 190-member ensemble based on
75 simulations run using different sets of atmospheric,
76 oceanic, and carbon cycle parameters derived from 19
77 atmosphere-ocean global climate models and 10 carbon
78 cycle models (Meinshausen *et al* 2011); equilibrium
79 climate sensitivity (ECS) in the ensemble ranges from 1.9
80 to 5.73 °C, with a mean (median) of 2.88 °C (2.59 °C). In
81 the default model properties, the ECS is 3 °C, and therefore
82 single-run simulations have slightly higher temperature
83 responses than ensemble means. A full list of experiments
84 can be found in the supplemental material, and include
85 baseline scenarios, mitigation pathways by sector and in
86 parallel, as well as sensitivity tests and uncertainty
87 assessments (such as how uncertainties in methane
88 parameters including lifetime and oxidation effects impact
89 our results). Unless otherwise noted, all uncertainty ranges
90 reported herein refer to \pm one standard deviation from the
91 mean based on the 190-member ensemble.

92 **3. Results**

93 We analyze the anticipated temperature responses to
94 baseline methane emissions in the absence of further
95 climate action, and assess the benefits of implementation of
96 available mitigation measures that could prevent a large
97 fraction of methane from being emitted over different
98 timelines. In the baseline case, methane emissions from
99 human activities are expected to continue rising over the
100 next few decades and throughout this century, yielding a
101 potential increase in emissions by end of century of more
102 than 70% relative to current levels, with emissions
103 exceeding 600 million metric tonnes (MMt) per year by
104 2100 compared to today’s level around 375 MMt/yr. Three

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2
3 1 quarters of emissions are projected to come from the
4 2 livestock, oil and gas, and landfill sectors – with similar
5 3 emissions magnitudes projected for each.

6 4 Historical methane emissions contribute to around 0.5
7 5 °C (± 0.1 °C) of present-day global-mean warming above
8 6 preindustrial levels (1850-1900; figure 2), which is around
9 7 half of carbon dioxide's contribution (0.9 ± 0.2 °C) and a
10 8 quarter of the gross warming from all warming pollutants
11 9 (1.85 ± 0.4 °C); note that cooling climate pollutants mask
12 10 some of this warming in the net absolute global-mean
13 11 temperature. With the expected rise in methane emissions
14 12 over the next few decades, methane may contribute 0.6 °C
15 13 (± 0.1 °C) by 2050, which would account for more than 20%
16 14 of the warming from all warming pollutants if non-methane
17 15 forcers followed an RCP8.5 trajectory. By end of century,
18 16 methane emissions in the absence of further climate action
19 17 could contribute to around 0.9 °C (± 0.2 °C) of global-mean
20 18 warming (figure 2). We note that this temperature response
21 19 is insensitive to the non-methane baseline emissions
22 20 assumptions (see supplemental material). Given that
23 21 several methane baseline projections in the literature
24 22 suggest even larger future methane emissions in the
25 23 absence of further climate action, this level of warming
26 24 could be even higher.

27 25 However, a survey of the literature suggests that rapid
28 26 deployment of available abatement technologies and
29 27 strategies by sector could cut anticipated global methane
30 28 emissions in 2030 by 57% (figure 1, 3(a)). Further, we
31 29 could achieve a reduction of 24% below anticipated levels
32 30 in 2030 through deployment of cost effective measures
33 31 alone (figure 1, 3(a)). Given methane's strong radiative
34 32 efficiency yet short atmospheric lifetime (Myhre *et al*
35 33 2013), these actions to reduce methane emissions will have
36 34 near-immediate effects in lowering global-mean
37 35 temperatures.

38 36 We find that relative to global-mean average warming
39 37 rates around 0.4 °C per decade from 2030 to 2050 in the
40 38 absence of further climate action, fast action to pursue all
41 39 economically feasible measures by 2030 could slow this
42 40 rate of warming by 12% ($\pm 1\%$), and this benefit could
43 41 double to 26% (24,30) with deployment of all technically
44 42 feasible measures (figure 3(c)). This slower pace of global-
45 43 mean warming means over a tenth of a degree (°C; ± 0.01)
46 44 may be avoided by midcentury from economically feasible
47 45 actions with over a quarter of degree (°C; ± 0.04) avoided
48 46 from technically feasible mitigation measures (figure 3(b-
49 47 c)).

50 48 However, many of these near-term benefits are missed
51 49 if methane action is slow or delayed. For example, we could
52 50 lose the opportunity to avoid an additional 0.2 °C of global-
53 51 mean warming in 2050 if we delay methane mitigation until
54 52 2040 (figure 3(b-c)) and lose the chance to slow global-
55 53 mean warming by nearly an additional 20%; this is an

54 entirely feasible path given the current focus on net zero
55 commitments for a 2050 timeframe. The rate of
56 implementation also matters, because we miss some
57 benefits even if we act early, but slowly. Beginning actions
58 now but with full implementation only achieved by 2050,
59 could yield 0.07 °C additional global-mean warming by
60 2050 and a greater than 5% increase in global-mean
61 warming rate from 2030 to 2050 compared to early and
62 rapid mitigation (figure 3(b-c)).

63 In the long-term, we find that sustaining economically
64 feasible mitigation measures throughout the 21st century
65 could avoid additional global-mean warming by nearly a
66 quarter of a degree (°C; ± 0.05) by 2100, whereas pursuing
67 all technically feasible measures could avoid half a degree
68 (°C; ± 0.09) (figure 3(b)). This level of avoided warming is
69 crucial for staying below the widely agreed upon global-
70 mean temperature target of 2 °C above preindustrial levels.

71 While the different mitigation implementation timelines
72 continue to play a role after 2050 in determining overall
73 magnitudes and rates of global-mean warming from
74 methane – even though the emissions pathways are
75 identical post-2050 (figure 3(a-b)) – the differences
76 become smaller over time and generally merge by 2100.
77 Therefore, if climate policy continues to focus on long-term
78 time horizons, the powerful near-term climate benefits of
79 fast methane action relative to slow or delayed action can
80 be overlooked given that long-term impacts are similar for
81 all timelines. This would miss a major opportunity to limit
82 warming and its damages over the next few decades. We
83 note that the magnitudes of avoided global-mean warming
84 reported herein are insensitive to the non-methane baseline
85 emissions assumptions, however, the relative reductions in
86 the global-mean rate of warming would increase if non-
87 methane baseline emissions decrease (see supplemental
88 material for more information).

89 The relative roles of major sectors in contributing to the
90 near- and long-term climate benefits from fast methane
91 action vary considerably by sector (figure 4). The majority
92 of economically feasible actions come from the oil and gas
93 sector, accounting for around 80% of the avoided warming
94 from economically feasible methane mitigation actions
95 over all timescales (figure 4); 20% of this avoided warming
96 comes from agreed upon targets by top oil and gas
97 companies to reduce upstream leakage (OGCI 2018). We
98 find that implementing current net zero cost oil and gas
99 supply chain mitigation measures, such as leak detection
100 and repair programs, along with fulfillment of company
101 commitments of capped leakage rates, could avoid around
102 0.1 °C of global-mean warming by midcentury and 0.2 °C
103 by end of century relative to a no further action baseline
104 that suggests the oil and gas sector could contribute 0.15 °C
105 to warming by 2050 and 0.25 °C by 2100 (figure 4).

1
2
3 1 For technically feasible mitigation, abatement measures
4 2 for landfills and livestock play important roles in addition
5 3 to oil and gas (figure 4). Implementation of all available
6 4 landfill measures (requiring at most only minor
7 5 improvements) – such as source separation – could avoid
8 6 0.16 °C of global-mean warming in 2100 relative to a no
9 7 further action baseline (figure 4). Deploying all livestock
10 8 abatement strategies – such as methane inhibitors and
11 9 improved manure management – could avoid nearly 0.1 °C
12 10 of global-mean warming in 2100 relative to a no further
13 11 action baseline (figure 4). However, given the amount of
14 12 livestock emissions that currently can't be addressed with
15 13 existing technologies, residual methane emissions from
16 14 livestock are expected to contribute to half of the remaining
17 15 future methane emissions unless there are behavioral
18 16 changes and technological advancements.

19 17 Given that there are specific uncertainties associated
20 18 with methane's climate impacts in addition to the various
21 19 uncertainties associated with all models and emissions
22 20 estimates, we perform several sensitivity tests to assess
23 21 how methane-related model parameters affect our results.
24 22 For example, there are uncertainties associated with the
25 23 radiative effects from methane's oxidation processes and
26 24 methane's atmospheric lifetime. Overall, the consideration
27 25 of their individual uncertainties in our analysis suggests a
28 26 global-mean temperature rise by end of century from
29 27 baseline methane emissions that ranges from 0.75 °C to 1.5
30 28 °C; see supplementary material for more details. Further,
31 29 we note that accounting for positive climate feedbacks such
32 30 as melting tundra may lead to even more warming from
33 31 methane emissions and is currently not included in our
34 32 model.

37 33 4. Conclusions

38 34 The goal of this study is to assess the value of rapidly
39 35 deploying available methane mitigation measures as
40 36 compared to slower implementation timelines or delayed
41 37 action, with an emphasis on sectoral contributions to
42 38 climate benefits over all timescales. We find that while the
43 39 potential to reduce methane emissions with existing
44 40 mitigation measures varies considerably by sector, if
45 41 deployed in parallel can cut expected 2030 methane
46 42 emissions in half, with a quarter at no net cost. We find that
47 43 full deployment of these available mitigation measures by
48 44 2030 can slow the rate of global-mean warming over the
49 45 next few decades by more than 25%, while preventing
50 46 around a quarter degree (°C) of additional global-mean
51 47 warming in 2050 and half a degree (°C) in 2100. On the
52 48 other hand, slow or delayed methane action leads to a 5%
53 49 or nearly 20% increase in global-mean warming rate from
54 50 2030 to 2050 relative to fast action, respectively. Oil and
55 51 gas measures dominate the avoided warming from
56 52 economically feasible actions, and landfill measures play a

53 secondary role to oil and gas in the avoided warming from
54 technically feasible actions. Livestock measures also play
55 an important role for technically feasible methane
56 mitigation, but a considerable fraction of emissions from
57 livestock still remain unabated.

58 Our results are in agreement with previous studies that
59 show sizable near-term and long-term climate benefits
60 from stringent methane mitigation, with similar levels of
61 avoided warming in midcentury and end of century given
62 the range in assumptions and methods (Shindell *et al* 2012,
63 Shoemaker *et al* 2013, Stohl *et al* 2015, Rogelj *et al* 2015,
64 Reisinger and Clark 2017, Collins *et al* 2018, Harmsen *et al*
65 2020, Smith *et al* 2020). Our analysis adds to this
66 growing body of literature by assessing the role of different
67 mitigation timelines in affecting the near-term climate
68 benefits, and by showing the sectoral contributions over
69 time. This study illuminates the near-term value of fast
70 methane action as opposed to slower or delayed action.

71 In the long-term, the large potential in avoided warming
72 from technically feasible measures is similar in magnitude
73 to the upper end of projections of avoided global-mean
74 warming from phasing out another important short-lived
75 climate pollutant, hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs; Xu *et al*
76 2013). The potential avoided warming from HFC phase-out
77 sparked an international agreement to curb future emissions
78 growth – the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol
79 – which entered into force in January 2019. Methane
80 mitigation has even larger potential benefits than HFC
81 mitigation because its future impact is projected to be
82 double that of HFCs (figure 3(b)).

83 The long-term climate benefits from both economically
84 and technically feasible methane mitigation scenarios in
85 this analysis can also be considered underestimates given
86 that we expect more abatement actions to become cost
87 effective with technology turnovers, and more abatement
88 actions to become available with technological
89 advancements; neither of which are considered in our
90 mitigation pathways. For example, the discovery,
91 development, and scale up of emerging techniques could
92 lead to higher sectoral abatement potentials, such as genetic
93 selection for low-methane emitting phenotype (de Haas *et al*
94 2017). Methane emissions can be further reduced by
95 shifts in behaviors such as decreased consumption of cattle
96 products and reduced food waste. Proposals to remove
97 methane from the atmosphere could also come to fruition
98 (Jackson *et al* 2019). In addition, as more economies put a
99 price on carbon or consider other forms of payment to
100 account for methane damages (via ozone) to public health,
101 agriculture, forests, etc. (Shindell *et al* 2012, 2017), the cost
102 effective options will expand, and the economically
103 feasible potential would move closer to the technically
104 feasible potential.

1 While we don't expect the methane mitigation measures
 2 we consider in our analysis to significantly affect emissions
 3 of other major climate pollutants, it is possible that some
 4 mitigation strategies for rice paddies can increase nitrous
 5 oxide emissions – although techniques exist to prevent this
 6 from occurring (Kritee *et al* 2018). On the other hand,
 7 actions designed to address other climate pollutant
 8 emissions, mainly carbon dioxide, can simultaneously
 9 reduce methane emissions from the energy sector.
 10 However, studies show that direct methane mitigation
 11 measures play a larger role in reducing methane compared
 12 to indirect methane reductions (Harmsen *et al* 2020), and
 13 provide important, additional climate benefits (IEA 2017).
 14 Further, many decarbonization pathways suggest that
 15 methane emissions will not be considerably reduced before
 16 midcentury (Riahi *et al* 2017) given that many strategies
 17 include an initial phase of switching from coal to natural
 18 gas, or, deployment of carbon capture and storage
 19 technologies – both of which will not appreciably reduce
 20 methane emissions. Therefore, we do not expect
 21 decarbonization of energy systems to affect the majority of
 22 our near-term climate benefits from direct methane
 23 mitigation measures.

24 Overall, the ability to substantially mitigate methane
 25 emissions with existing strategies is clearly an effective
 26 lever to limit future warming and associated damage to
 27 social and natural systems. Through immediate and rapid
 28 implementation of available methane mitigation measures,
 29 many that incur no net cost, we could see significant
 30 benefits in a single generation through slowed rates of
 31 warming, while also setting ourselves on a better course for
 32 generations to come. Employing these measures is
 33 undoubtedly essential to achieving ambitious warming
 34 targets, and can reduce the likelihood of passing tipping
 35 points and triggering positive feedbacks (Collins *et al* 2018,
 36 Fu *et al* 2020). Further, methane mitigation has been shown
 37 to be of additional benefit through reductions in
 38 tropospheric ozone that is toxic to many crops (Shindell
 39 *et al* 2012). While not a substitute for the unequivocally-
 40 imperative need of reaching carbon dioxide neutrality,
 41 methane mitigation is a powerful ally that should be
 42 pursued now with increased seriousness.

43 Acknowledgements

44 We thank Joel Plagenz and Jon Coifman for thoughtful
 45 feedback on earlier versions of the paper; Lena Höglund-
 46 Isaksson and Larry Horowitz for technical guidance; Mark
 47 Brownstein, Fred Krupp, and Jane Long for helpful
 48 discussions; Maureen Lackner, Alex Franco, and Naomi
 49 Cohen-Shields for analytical support; and Daniel Zavala-
 50 Araiza, David Lyon, Mark Omara, and Jonathan
 51 Camuzeaux for guidance on natural gas emissions and
 52 mitigation. We also thank two anonymous reviewers for

53 thoughtful feedback and suggestions. The work underlying
 54 this analysis was supported by grants from the Robertson
 55 and Heising Simons Foundations.

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Example mitigation measures considered in abatement potentials
 (* indicates sometimes can be at no net cost)

| | |
|----------------------|--|
| Livestock | Methane inhibitors*, electron sinks*, oils and oilseeds*, intensive grazing*, improved feed conversion*, manure coverage and digester systems*, selective breeding; do not include changing human diet |
| Rice | Improved irrigation systems*, cropping techniques*, and fertilization levels* such as incorporation of rice straw compost before transplanting coupled with intermittent irrigation and use of alternative hybrids and soil amendment |
| Oil & Gas | Upstream leak detection and replacement*, replacing pumps*, replacing with instrument air systems*, vapour recovery units*, blowdown capture*, replace with electric motor, early replacement of devices, replace compressor seal or rod, install flares, install plunger, downstream leak detection and replacement |
| Coal Mining | Pre-mining degasification*, coal drying*, flooding abandoned mines*, ventilation air methane (VAM) oxidation with improved ventilation, open flaring, |
| Landfills | Electricity generation with reciprocating engine/gas turbine/CHP/microturbine and landfill gas recovery for direct use*, source separation with recycling or treatment with energy recovery for municipal, recycling or treatment with energy recovery for industrial; no landfills of organic waste |
| Wastewater | Open sewer to aerobic wastewater treatment plan*, domestic wastewater treatment is upgraded from primary treatment to secondary/tertiary anaerobic treatment with biogas recovery and utilization, industrial wastewater treatment is upgraded to two-stage treatment such as anaerobic with biogas recovery followed by aerobic treatment |

Table 1. List of prominent methane mitigation measures for each sector that are specified in at least one assessment of marginal abatement cost curves and maximum technical abatement potentials.

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


Figure 1. Global annual anthropogenic methane emissions abatement potentials in 2030 relative to baseline. Mitigation potentials are divided into two categories: economically feasible actions (no net cost based current cost assessments) and technically feasible actions (all available technologies); technically feasible includes economically feasible. Implementation of measures begin in 2020 with full deployment achieved by 2030. Sector percentages on the verge of the pie refer to share of total sector baseline emissions in 2030 assuming no further climate action. Sector percentages within the pie refer to economically and technically feasible abatement potentials as a percent below the baseline. In addition to no net cost options, we consider commitments made by oil and gas companies as ‘economically feasible,’ with the assumption that companies have found it fits into their business models. The contribution of company commitments to abatement potentials is shown in the line pattern. Note that more radical policy proposals or behavioural changes are not included here, which could increase mitigation levels. For example, human dietary changes could considerably reduce methane emissions from livestock at no cost. More information on data sources, assumptions, and explanations can be found in the supplemental material.




Figure 2. Global-mean surface air temperature change (°C relative to the 1850-1900 global-mean average) in response to historical and future (baseline) anthropogenic methane emissions, compared to temperature responses from all anthropogenic and natural forcings, all anthropogenic warming pollutant emissions (greenhouse gases and black carbon), and anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions. Error bars show \pm one standard deviation from the ensemble-mean based on a 190-member ensemble developed by combinations of climate and carbon cycle parameters based on 19 AOGCMs and ten carbon cycle models, respectively. Future emissions of all non-methane climate pollutants are from RCP 8.5, and the methane-only temperature responses is insensitive to the non-methane climate pollutant emission scenario. Observations of temperature changes to date relative to 1880 global temperatures are shown in + markers and are taken from NOAA (2020) data.




Figure 3. Global anthropogenic methane emissions and resulting temperature responses from 2020 through 2100 for baseline and mitigation scenarios. (a) shows emissions for baseline (red) and mitigation (blue) scenarios for three implementation timelines: fast mitigation (solid blue lines), slow mitigation (dashed lines), and delayed mitigation (dotted lines). (b) shows the global-mean temperature responses ($^{\circ}\text{C}$) attributed to future global anthropogenic methane emissions only based on a 190-member ensemble. (c) shows the near-term temperature benefits of mitigation actions in terms of avoided warming ($^{\circ}\text{C}$) in 2050 and reduction in 2030 to 2050 decadal warming rate (%) relative to the all-forcing baseline scenario. Error bars represent \pm one standard deviation from the ensemble-mean based on a 190-member ensemble.




Figure 4. Baseline temperature responses and avoided warming in °C by sector for methane mitigation measures fully employed by 2030 and maintained throughout the 21st century, for both economically and technically feasible measures. Economically feasible measures (“econ”) refer to current no net cost options. For oil and gas, we include commitments made by oil and gas companies, with the assumption that companies have found it fits into their business models. The contribution of company commitments to avoided warming beyond current no net cost options is shown in the line pattern (“econ cc”). Technically feasible measures include all readily available technologies in addition to no net cost options. Note that the sum of sector totals are slightly than those in figure 3(b), which is mainly due to a higher equilibrium climate sensitivity used in single model runs (3 °C) compared to the 190-member ensemble means (2.88 °C).